Wednesday, October 28, 2009

Jago Pakistanio Khuda Ke Liye Jago!!!تیرا پاکستان ہے یہ میرا پاکستان

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Sunday, October 25, 2009

Huma Wasim, wife of Wasim Akram Dies

Huma Wasim, wife of Wasim Akram Dies

http://picturrs.com/files/funzug/imgs/celebrities/cricketers_wifes_07.jpg

Pakistanis embraced a sad news in the morning of Sunday, as they woke up to the news of the tragic death of Huma Wasim, the wife of Pakistani star cricket Wasim Akram. She suffered from a unique kind of bacteria which she got infected by after eating a meal. The bacteria strikes very rarely to any one in millions of people.

Huma Wasim was being flown to Singapore, in a chartered plane for treatment but due to critical condition, the plane landed at Chennai, and after some days of treatment in Apolo Hospital Chennai, Huma died.

We all share the grief of Wasim bhai. May Almighty rest her soul in peace.


The happy couple broke !!



 
 
wasim and huma with their son
 
 
Their wedding pic in 1994
 
 

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Sunday, October 18, 2009

India ’staged’ Mumbai drama, hotel guests testify

India 'staged' Mumbai drama, hotel guests testify

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A recent report published by the BBC points more fingers towards Indian security agencies for actually staging the entire Mumbai drama. The stories craft by the Indian electronic and print media were absolutely absurd from the very beginning. Now we have it that the guests who had trapped themselves inside hotel rooms for safety were actually instructed by policemen to leave the building while the fighting raged on.

Several other things have been left unanswered, including the gross failure of Indian security and intelligence agencies that such a big terrorist attack happened right under their nose, in a country aspiring to become a regional superpower. All these questions that raise in one's mind have been discussed before here and at several other forums.

So much so that the Indian minister for minorities had to resign for raising the issue of Mr. Karkare's suspicious killing at an unknown location on the same day – the senior Indian policeman who had exposed the masterminds of the Samjhota express bombings and held a Hindu serving Indian army Colonel for the same.

Yet India is still pushing forward with its absurd, concocted story of the deadly Mumbai terror attacks holding Pakistan responsible, while all evidence points towards it as being a staged drama by Indian Hindu extremists who have penetrated Indian state machinery in large numbers.

Following is the BBC news report, in which guests at the Taj hotel have testified against the Indian police..

By Adam Mynott
BBC News, Mumbai

Guests trapped in a Mumbai hotel seized by gunmen last month have told the BBC they were given instructions by police that may have led to more people dying.

Police told a group hiding in the Taj Mahal Palace hotel that it was safe to leave the building, a survivor said.

But members of the group were shot and killed by militant gunmen as they were making their way out.

The senior policeman in charge of the operation in the hotel has denied the allegations against his officers.

'Suspicious'

A prominent Mumbai gynaecologist, Dr Prashant Mangeshikar, was trapped in the Taj Mahal hotel along with hundreds of other guests as gunmen stormed into the building, firing indiscriminately.

Terrified, he and others barricaded themselves into a room and waited.

Eventually, in the early hours of the morning, police officers made it through to where they were hiding and told people it was safe to leave the hotel because the gunmen were cornered on another floor.

Some went ahead but Dr Mangeshikar held back.

"I was a little suspicious that the police were actually sending these guys down a different route where the terrorists were supposed to be," he said.

"I refused to move away and the people who ran ahead of me, about 20 or 30 of them, all of them died."

A dress designer from the city says her aunt was shot dead and her cousin seriously wounded because they followed police instructions to try to leave.

The designer, Shilpa, described the police conduct as disgraceful.

They had no right, she said, to risk people's lives.

The senior policeman in charge of the operation in the hotel has denied these allegations against his officers.

But they add to growing criticism of the police and how they responded to the attack in which more than 170 people were killed.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7794211.stm

The move seems to be one to fuel more hatred against Pakistan by increasing the number of deaths as a result of this barbaric act.

Shame on you India! You kill your own people to wage war against Pakistan! And God knows that you cannot sustain a full war for no more than 15 (FIFTEEN) days – given the recession that has hit your economy too.



BBC NEWS
Deaths from Mumbai 'police error'

Guests trapped in a Mumbai hotel seized by gunmen last month have told the BBC they were given instructions by police that may have led to more people dying.

A survivor who had been hiding at the Taj Mahal Palace hotel said some guests were shot and killed by the militants after police said it was safe to leave.

The senior policeman in charge of the operation in the hotel has denied the allegations against his officers.

The attacks left at least 173 people dead, including nine of the 10 gunmen.

India blames Pakistan-based militants Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) for the 26 November attacks.

LeT and the Pakistani government have denied any involvement.

Two of the hotels caught up in the attacks, the Trident-Oberoi and Taj Mahal Palace, are to re-open on Sunday.

Armed guards and sniffer dogs have been stationed at both hotels and X-ray machines are to screen guests' bags.

'Suspicious'

Taj Mahal hotel on fire - 27/11/2008
Fifty-two people were killed at the Taj hotel,
Indian officials say

A prominent Mumbai gynaecologist, Dr Prashant Mangeshikar, was trapped in the Taj Mahal hotel along with hundreds of other guests as gunmen stormed into the building, firing indiscriminately.

Terrified, he and others barricaded themselves into a room and waited.

" I refused to move away and the people who ran ahead of me, about 20 or 30 of them, all of them died "
Dr Prashant Mangeshikar

Eventually, in the early hours of the morning, police officers made it through to where they were hiding and told people it was safe to leave the hotel because the gunmen were cornered on another floor.

Some went ahead but Dr Mangeshikar held back.

"I was a little suspicious that the police were actually sending these guys down a different route where the terrorists were supposed to be," he told the BBC's Adam Mynott.

"I refused to move away and the people who ran ahead of me, about 20 or 30 of them, all of them died."

A dress designer from the city says her aunt was shot dead and her cousin seriously wounded because they followed police instructions to try to leave.

The designer, Shilpa, described the police conduct as disgraceful.

They had no right, she said, to risk people's lives.

Hotels re-open

The senior policeman in charge of the operation in the hotel has denied these allegations against his officers.

But they add to growing criticism of the police and how they responded to the attack, says our correspondent.

The government of India's Maharashtra state has already announced an investigation into two senior policemen over alleged failure to act on warnings of the attacks.

India's interior minister and Maharashtra state chief minister have already resigned.

Pakistan's President Asif Ali Zardari said claims that the sole surviving attacker had been identified by his own father as coming from Pakistan had not been proven. The man has been named as Mohammed Ajmal Amir Qasab and is in Indian police custody.

Listen to Adam Mynott's full report on BBC World Service

on 21 December at 1200, 2000 or 2100 GMT.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/7794211.stm

Published: 2008/12/21 07:49:06 GMT

© BBC MMIX

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Friday, October 16, 2009

Religious Systematic Discrimination in Saudi Arabia

NOTE: FW Message (Please Confirm by your self)

    We'll continue to pray irrespective of consequences

    Sayed Mohammad Al-Nasser, Jumaa Imam in Khobar city,
    said that Saudi Shia will continue performing Jumaa prayers whatever
    the consequences are and that they are waiting for a royal resolution
    on the closure of Shia mosques.

    Al-Nasser, a leading Saudi Shia scholar of Al-Khobar city, East of Saudi Arabia,
    said that "performing Jumaa prayers is our natural right as Muslims
    and as citizens loyal to their land and religion."

    During Jumaa prayer which was held in a house in Al-Khobar,
    Al-Nasser condemned the religious discrimination among citizens
    where Sunnis are allowed to perform prayers in their masjids
    and Shia are not allowed do the same thing.

    Authorities had already closed five Shia masjids in Khobar city where about 20,000
    Shia citizens live there according to unofficial sources.

    Saudi authorities(wahabis) do not allow their Shia citizens to build their own masjids nor have
    their own cemeteries in areas outside Qatif, Al-Hasa and
    Najran where they are majority.

    The official bodies in Eastern Province Governance and
    the Ministry of Religious Affairs do not provide reasons for the ban on Shia.
    Royal Decree

    Al-Nasser said that Shia citizens are waiting for a royal decree
    by King Abdullah to resolve the issue of continuous closure of Shia masjids.

    High level Shia delegation from Khobar met King Abdullah on July 19 to brief him
    about the closure of Shia masjids and he promised to look in to
    the subject matter but so far there are no positive results.

    Al-Nasser pointed out that some of the local officials encourage Shia,
    who visit them for complaint, to perform prayers in Sunni masjids
    instead of granting permission to build their own.

    Al-Nasser said "we request one of the Sunni masjids to allow us use their masjid
     during Ramadan but they refued unless we get a permission from Emara or Awqaf."
    As a result, Shia citizens built a large tent to perform prayers during Ramadan.

    Authorities called Hajj Abdullah Al-Muhana, the custodian of the tent,
    and forced him to sign an undertaking to remove the tent or he will be sent to jail.

    Al-Nasser said that we are currently waiting in an anticipation
    to hear from the officials to resolve pending issues.
    Human Rights Watch said in a report released recently,
    that Saudi(wahabus) is practicing Systematic Discrimination
    and Hostility toward Saudi Shia Citizens.

    State discrimination against Shia extends to realms other than religious freedom.
    The report cites discrimination in the education system,
    where Shia may not teach religion in class and Shia pupils
    learn from Sunni teachers that they are unbelievers.


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Thursday, October 15, 2009

Militants attack Lahor

Militants ambush Pakistan police, 19 killed: officials

LAHORE, Pakistan — Gunmen stormed three police buildings in Pakistan's cultural capital Lahore on Thursday while a suicide car bomber slammed into another police station in the northwest, killing 19 people.

The simultaneous assaults underscored the weakness of a police force on the frontline against Taliban militants who have exacted 11 days of carnage with the military believed to be readying a new offensive near the Afghan border.

Nuclear-armed Pakistan, which borders Afghanistan and is a key ally in the US-led "war on terror" has seen Taliban and Al-Qaeda linked attacks kill 2,250 people in more than two years and 137 people in the last 11 days.

Two of the police buildings in Lahore were attacked previously -- a training academy that was assaulted in a commando-style raid that took security forces eight hours to bring under control last March and a second bombed in 2008.

"All three were terrorist attacks... Seven people were killed. Four were police officials. Details about three other fatalities are being collected," Punjab provincial law minister Rana Sanaullah Khan told Geo television.

Around five people attacked the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) building, 10-15 gunmen stormed the police commando academy in Bedian and 10 militants attacked a police school in Manawan, both on the outskirts of Lahore.

"Different group of attackers have attacked and tried to enter two police training centres in Lahore. We now have three near-simultaneous attacks against police facilities," police official Kamran Ahmad told AFP.

Police said the attack at the FIA building was quickly repelled and that firing had stopped at Manawan, where police reinforcements were inside.

"The building has been cleared. The operation is complete. There were five dead total... three of them are police officials," said senior Lahore police official Haider Ashraf.

Pakistan's weak civilian government sought to under play the attacks.

"The firing is going on at two other places -- Bedian and Manawan -- where forces are alert. You will soon hear good news from there. We will take control," Interior Minister Rehman Malik told reporters.

Thursday's attacks underscored poor police security. The training centre at Manawan was attacked on March 30. Eight police recruits died before security forces finally overpowered the multi-pronged assault after nearly eight hours.

The FIA building in Lahore was bombed in March 2008, killing 16 people.

In the northwest town of Kohat near Peshawar, district police chief Dilawar Bangash said 11 people were killed.

"The bomber ploughed his car into the outer wall of the police station" in Kohat, he told AFP, adding that the building was badly damaged.

Eight people have died, including civilians and children, and the toll may go up, Kohat police official Fazle Naeem said with fears that some people may be trapped under the debris.

At least 52 civilians were killed on Friday when a suicide bomber rammed his car into a market in Peshawar.

The following day, Taliban-linked gunmen staged an audacious raid on army headquarters near Islamabad with 22 people killed in a day-long siege that also saw 39 hostages freed by commando troops.

After the militants' brazen headquarters assault, speculation has intensified that the military is preparing to go into the insurgent hotbed of South Warizistan with tens of thousands of residents fleeing their homes.

The pre-dawn strike targeted the suspected militant compound in Dandey Darpa Khel near the Afghan border, a security official said.

US President Barack Obama is poised to sign a bill giving 7.5 billion dollars to build schools, roads and democratic institutions in Pakistan as part of a strategy to discredit extremists in the nation and Afghanistan.


Photo 2 of 4

Map locating Lahore.

Map


Source:  AFP More »
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Tuesday, October 13, 2009

Pakistan cricket captain Younis Khan resigns

KARACHI: Younis Khan has resigned as captain of Pakistan in protest at match-fixing allegations made against the team by a senior member of parliament.

 

Younus submitted his resignation to the Chairman of the Pakistan Cricket Board (PCB) Ijaz Butt during a hearing of the National Assembly standing committee on sports in Islamabad on Tuesday.

 

The hearing was called to discuss the performance of the team in the Champions Trophy after the NA committee Chairman Jamshed Dasti said on television he had evidence Pakistan deliberately under-performed against Australia and New Zealand in the tournament.

 

Younis Khan's perspective is not for everybody to hear that is why we called him in the meeting, Jamshed Dasti, chairman senate standing committee said.

 

'I could not stand cricitism from all and sundry as it was affecting my performance that is why I resigned,' said Khan.

 

A PCB official who spoke to Dawn.com on condition of anonymity believes there is more to the story than just criticism of the team and the captain.

 

'Younis Khan was mystified as to why vice-captain Shahid Afridi was called up to discuss the New Zealand and Australia series when the captain himself was available in the country and recovering from what was only a hairline fracture. He could not understand the reason for being left out of the loop for two very important tours,' he said.

 

However, PCB chairman Ijaz Butt has refused to accept Younis Khan's resignation.


Source:http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/cricket/03-younis-khan-resigns-ss-03



Windows Live: Friends get your Flickr, Yelp, and Digg updates when they e-mail you.
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Wednesday, October 7, 2009

The Kerry-Lugar Bill: details and conditions

WASHINGTON: The following is the text of the Kerry-Lugar Bill passed by the Senate on Thursday, Sept 24, 2009. It will now go to the House of Representatives and if passed without amendments, will be sent to President Barack Obama for signing into law:

S.1707

Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by Senate)

SEC. 203. LIMITATIONS ON CERTAIN ASSISTANCE.

(a) Limitation on Security-related Assistance: For fiscal years 2011 through 2014, no security-related assistance may be provided to Pakistan in a fiscal year until the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, makes the certification required under subsection (c) for such fiscal year.

(b) Limitation on Arms Transfers: For fiscal years 2012 through 2014, no letter of offer to sell major defence equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC 2751 et seq.) and no license to export major defence equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to such Act in a fiscal year until the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, makes the certification required under subsection (c) for such fiscal year.

(c) Certification: The certification required by this subsection is a certification by the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, to the appropriate congressional committees that: (1) the Government of Pakistan is continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks;

(2) the Government of Pakistan during the preceding fiscal year has demonstrated a sustained commitment to and is making significant efforts towards combating terrorist groups, consistent with the purposes of assistance described in section 201, including taking into account the extent to which the Government of Pakistan has made progress on matters such as (A) ceasing support, including by any elements within the Pakistan military or its intelligence agency, to extremist and terrorist groups, particularly to any group that has conducted attacks against the United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan, or against the territory or people of neighbouring countries;




(B) preventing al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, from operating in the territory of Pakistan, including carrying out cross-border attacks into neighbouring countries, closing terrorist camps in the Fata, dismantling terrorist bases of operations in other parts of the country, including Quetta and Muridke, and taking action when provided with intelligence about high-level terrorist targets;
and (C) strengthening counterterrorism and anti-money laundering laws; and (3) the security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan.

(d) Certain Payments: (1) IN GENERAL- Subject to paragraph (2), none of the funds appropriated for security-related assistance for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, or any amounts appropriated to the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32), may be obligated or expended to make payments relating to (A) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK-D-YAD signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006; (B) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK-D-NAP signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006; and C) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK-D-SAF signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006.

(2) EXCEPTION: Funds appropriated for security-related assistance for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 may be used for construction and related activities carried out pursuant to the Letters of Offer and Acceptance described in paragraph (1).

(e) Waiver: (1) IN GENERAL - The Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, may waive the limitations contained in subsections (a), (b), and (d) for a fiscal year if the Secretary of State determines that is important to the national security interests of the United States to do so.

(2) PRIOR NOTICE OF WAIVER: The Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, may not exercise the authority of paragraph (1) until seven days after the Secretary of State provides to the appropriate congressional committees a written notice of the intent to issue to waiver and the reasons therefore. The notice may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, as necessary.

(f) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined: In this section, the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

SEC. 204. PAKISTAN COUNTERINSURGENCY CAPABILITY FUND.

(a) For Fiscal Year 2010: (1) IN GENERAL - For fiscal year 2010, the Department of State’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32), hereinafter in this section referred to as the `Fund’, shall consist of the following: (A) Amounts appropriated to carry out this subsection (which may not include any amounts appropriated to carry out title I of this Act).

(B) Amounts otherwise available to the Secretary of State to carry out this subsection.

(2) PURPOSES OF FUND: Amounts in the Fund made available to carry out this subsection for any fiscal year are authorised to be used by the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defence, to build and maintain the counterinsurgency capability of Pakistan under the same terms and conditions (except as otherwise provided in this subsection) that are applicable to amounts made available under the Fund for fiscal year 2009.

(3) TRANSFER AUTHORITY: (A) IN GENERAL - The Secretary of State is authorised to transfer amounts in the fund made available to carry out this subsection for any fiscal year to the Department of Defence’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32) and such amounts may be transferred back to the Fund if the Secretary of Defence, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, determines that such amounts are not needed for the purposes for which initially transferred.

(B) TREATMENT OF TRANSFERRED FUNDS: Subject to subsections (d) and (e) of section 203, transfers from the Fund under the authority of subparagraph (A) shall be merged with and be available for the same purposes and for the same time period as amounts in the Department of Defence’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund.

(C) RELATION TO OTHER AUTHORITIES: The authority to provide assistance under this subsection is in addition to any other authority to provide assistance to foreign countries.

(D) NOTIFICATION: The Secretary of State shall, not less than 15 days prior to making transfers from the Fund under subparagraph (A), notify the appropriate congressional committees in writing of the details of any such transfer.

(b) Submission of Notifications: Any notification required by this section may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, as necessary.

(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined: In this section, the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means (1) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

SEC. 205. REQUIREMENTS FOR CIVILIAN CONTROL OF CERTAIN ASSISTANCE

(a) Requirements: (1) IN GENERAL - For fiscal years 2010 through 2014, any direct cash security-related assistance or non-assistance payments by the United States to the Government of Pakistan may only be provided or made to civilian authorities of a civilian government of Pakistan.

(2) DOCUMENTATION: For fiscal years 2010 through 2014, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defence, shall ensure that civilian authorities of a civilian government of Pakistan have received a copy of final documentation provided to the United States related to non-assistance payments provided or made to the Government of Pakistan.

(b) Waiver: 1) SECURITY-RELATED ASSISTANCE: The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defence, may waive the requirements of subsection (a) with respect to security-related assistance described in subsection (a) funded from accounts within budget function 150 (International Affairs) if the Secretary of State certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the waiver is important to the national security interest of the United States.

(2) NON-ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS: The Secretary of Defence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, may waive the requirements of subsection (a) with respect to non-assistance payments described in subsection (a) funded from accounts within budget function 050 (National Defence) if the Secretary of Defense certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the waiver is important to the national security interest of the United States.

(c) Application to Certain Activities- Nothing in this section shall apply with respect to (1) any activities subject to reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.); (2) any assistance to promote democratic elections or public participation in democratic processes; (3) any assistance or payments if the Secretary of State determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that subsequent to the termination of assistance or payments a democratically elected government has taken office; (4) any assistance or payments made pursuant to section 1208 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375; 118 Stat. 2086), as amended; (5) any payments made pursuant to the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; and (6) any assistance or payments made pursuant to section 943 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (Public Law 110-417; 122 Stat. 4578).

(d) Definitions- In this section (1) the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations of the Senate; and (2) the term ‘civilian government of Pakistan’ does not include any government of Pakistan whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree.

TITLE III--STRATEGY, ACCOUNTABILITY, MONITORING, AND OTHER PROVISIONS SEC. 301. STRATEGY REPORTS.

(a) Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report- Not later than 45 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing United States policy and strategy with respect to assistance to Pakistan under this Act. The report shall include the following: (1) A description of the principal objectives of United States assistance to Pakistan to be provided under title I of this Act.

(2) A general description of the specific programs, projects, and activities designed to achieve the purposes of section 101 and the respective funding levels for such programs, projects, and activities for fiscal years 2010 through 2014.

(3) A plan for program monitoring, operations research, and impact evaluation research for assistance authorized under title I of this Act.

(4) A description of the role to be played by Pakistani national, regional, and local officials and members of Pakistani civil society and local private sector, civic, religious, and tribal leaders in helping to identify and implement programs and projects for which assistance is to be provided under this Act, and of consultations with such representatives in developing the strategy.

(5) A description of the steps taken, or to be taken, to ensure assistance provided under this Act is not awarded to inspaniduals or entities affiliated with terrorist organizations.

(6) A projection of the levels of assistance to be provided to Pakistan under this Act, broken down into the following categories as described in the annual `Report on the Criteria and Methodology for Determining the Eligibility of Candidate Countries for Millennium Challenge Account Assistance’: (A) Civil liberties. (B) Political rights. (C) Voice and accountability. (D) Government effectiveness. (E) Rule of law. (F) Control of corruption. (G) Immunization rates. (H) Public expenditure on health. (I) Girls’ primary education completion rate. (J) Public expenditure on primary education. (K) Natural resource management. (L) Business start-up. (M) Land rights and access. (N) Trade policy. (O) Regulatory quality. (P) Inflation control. (Q) Fiscal policy.

(7) An analysis for the suitable replacement for existing Pakistani helicopters, including recommendations for sustainment and training.

(b) Comprehensive Regional Strategy Report: (1) SENSE OF CONGRESS: It is the sense of Congress that the achievement of United States national security goals to eliminate terrorist threats and close safe havens in Pakistan requires the development of a comprehensive plan that utilizes all elements of national power, including in coordination and cooperation with other concerned governments, and that it is critical to Pakistan’s long-term prosperity and security to strengthen regional relationships among India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

(2) COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: The President shall develop a comprehensive interagency regional security strategy to eliminate terrorist threats and close safe havens in Pakistan, including by working with the Government of Pakistan and other relevant governments and organizations in the region and elsewhere, as appropriate, to best implement effective counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts in and near the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, including the FATA, the NWFP, parts of Balochistan, and parts of Punjab.

(3) REPORT: (A) IN GENERAL- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the comprehensive regional security strategy required under paragraph (2).

(B) CONTENTS- The report shall include a copy of the comprehensive regional security strategy, including specifications of goals, and proposed timelines and budgets for implementation of the strategy.

(C) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED: In this paragraph, the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means (i) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and (ii) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

(c) Security-related Assistance Plan- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan for the proposed use of amounts authorized for security-related assistance for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2014. Such plan shall include an assessment of how the use of such amounts complements or otherwise is related to amounts described in section 204.

SEC. 302. MONITORING REPORTS.

(a) Semi-Annual Monitoring Report- Not later than 180 days after the submission of the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report pursuant to section 301(a), and every 180 days thereafter through September 30, 2014, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the assistance provided under this Act during the preceding 180-day period. The report shall include—

(1) a description of all assistance by program, project, and activity, as well as by geographic area, provided pursuant to title I of this Act during the period covered by the report, including the amount of assistance provided for each program or project, and with respect to the first report a description of all amounts made available for assistance to Pakistan during fiscal year 2009, including a description of each program, project, and activity for which funds were made available; (2) a list of persons or entities from the United States or other countries that have received funds in excess of $100,000 to conduct projects under title I of this Act during the period covered by the report, which may be included in a classified annex, if necessary to avoid a security risk, and a justification for the classification; (3) with respect to the plan described in section 301(a)(3), updates to such plan and a description of best practices to improve the impact of the assistance authorized under title I of this Act; (4) an assessment of the effectiveness of assistance provided under title I of this Act during the period covered by the report in achieving desired objectives and outcomes as guided by the plan described in section 301(a)(3), and as updated pursuant to paragraph (3) of this subsection, including a systematic, qualitative, and where possible, quantitative basis for assessing whether desired outcomes are achieved and a timeline for completion of each project and program; (5) a description of any shortfall in United States financial, physical, technical, or human resources that hinder the effective use and monitoring of such funds; (6) a description of any negative impact, including the absorptive capacity of the region for which the resources are intended, of United States bilateral or multilateral assistance and recommendations for modification of funding, if any; (7) any incidents or reports of waste, fraud, and abuse of expenditures under title I of this Act; (8) the amount of funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to section 102 that were used during the reporting period for administrative expenses or for audits and program reviews pursuant to the authority under sections 101(c)(2) and 103; (9) a description of the expenditures made from any Chief of Mission Fund established pursuant to section 101(c)(5) during the period covered by the report, the purposes for which such expenditures were made, and a list of the recipients of any expenditures from the Chief of Mission Fund in excess of $100,000; (10) an accounting of assistance provided to Pakistan under title I of this Act, broken down into the categories set forth in section 301(a)(6); (11) an evaluation of efforts undertaken by the Government of Pakistan to (A) disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist and terrorist groups in the FATA and settled areas; (B) eliminate the safe havens of such forces in Pakistan; (C) close terrorist camps, including those of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed; (D) cease all support for extremist and terrorist groups; (E) prevent attacks into neighbouring countries; (F) increase oversight over curriculum in Madrassas, including closing Madrassas with direct links to the Taliban or other extremist and terrorist groups; and (G) improve counterterrorism financing and anti-money laundering laws, apply for observer status for the Financial Action Task Force, and take steps to adhere to the United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism; (12) a detailed description of Pakistan’s efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear-related material and expertise; (13) an assessment of whether assistance provided to Pakistan has directly or indirectly aided the expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, whether by the spanersion of United States assistance or the reallocation of Pakistan’s financial resources that would otherwise be spent for programs and activities unrelated to its nuclear weapons program; (14) a detailed description of the extent to which funds obligated and expended pursuant to section 202(b) meet the requirements of such section; and (15) an assessment of the extent to which the Government of Pakistan exercises effective civilian control of the military, including a description of the extent to which civilian executive leaders and parliament exercise oversight and approval of military budgets, the chain of command, the process of promotion for senior military leaders, civilian involvement in strategic guidance and planning, and military involvement in civil administration.

(b) Government Accountability Office Reports:

(1) PAKISTAN ASSISTANCE STRATEGY REPORT: Not later than one year after the submission of the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report pursuant to section 301(a), the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains (A) a review of, and comments addressing, the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report; (B) recommendations relating to any additional actions the Comptroller General believes could help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of United States efforts to meet the objectives of this Act; (C) a detailed description of the expenditures made by Pakistan pursuant to grant assistance under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC.

Saturday, September 26, 2009
News Desk
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